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The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (I.N.S.) fight to
stem the tide of illegal aliens crossing the United States-Mexican
border has recently received several setbacks from the federal
courts. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,' five members of
the U. S. Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of an auto-
mobile made without probable cause by roving Border Patrol of-
ficers violates the Fourth Amendment. In a seven to six decision
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc in United
States v. Bowen,2 concluded that the decision in Almeida-Sanchez
also applied to a warrantless, non-probable cause search conducted
by the Patrol at a fixed checkpoint forty-nine highway miles north
of the Mexican-American border. The Fifth Circuit reached
the same conclusion in United States v. Speed,3 where the search
was made at a temporary checkpoint.
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit was aware of the
fact that in the case of United States v. Bowman,4 a panel of the
Tenth Circuit had held that Almeida-Sanchez does not prevent the
Border Patrol from operating fixed checkpoints for the pur-
pose of stopping cars to make routine inquiries as to the nationality
of the occupants, even without a warrant.
These cases, however, do not deal the death-blow to the Pa-
trol's practice of stopping cars and making such inquiries, either
while on roving patrol or at checkpoints. Although applicable
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1. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). For a good review of the search and seizure prob-
lems concerning illegal aliens, see Note, The Aftermath of Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States: Automobile Searches for Aliens Take on a New Look, 10 CALIF.
WEST. L. REV. 657 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 657].
2. 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
3. 489 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1973). See also, United States v. Felix Hum-
berto Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
4. 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
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only in the Tenth Circuit, the Bowman Case approves such an in-
quiry at a checkpoint even without probable cause or without
a warrant. But of greater significance is the fact that there ap-
pears to be seven justices of the Supreme Court who are willing
to allow the Border Patrol not only to stop and inquire under a
proper warrant, but also to permit the Patrol to search the stopped
automobile. The seven Justices include the four dissenters,5 two
of the majority," and Justice Powell in Almeida-Sanchez.
I. BALANCING FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Justice Powell, although joining with the majority in holding
the search in Almeida-Sanchez unconsitutional, concluded that
such searches would meet Fourth Amendment standards if con-
ducted under the authority of a warrant. After examining a num-
ber of factors relating to the control of the illegal alien traffic into
the United States, Justice Powell wrote:
The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial ap-
proval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution
of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion on those
whose automobiles are searched-persuades me that under
appropriate limiting circumstances there may exist a consti-
tutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct
roving vehicular searches in border areas.7
His approach to the solution of the illegal alien problem is
one of balancing, for he notes further:
We are confronted here with the all too familiar necessity of
reconciling a legitimate need of government with constitu-
tionally protected rights. There can be no question as to the
seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement problem
with respect to enforcing along thousands of miles of open
border valid immigration and related laws. Nor can there
be any question as to the necessity, in our free society, of safe-
guarding persons against searches and seizures proscribed by
the Fourth Amendment. 8
5. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 288 (1973). The dis-
senters were the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
6. Id., at 270, n.3.
7. Id., at 279.
8. Id., at 275. There is a question as to whether balancing is the cor-
rect method of solving Fourth Amendment problems, but it is clear that that ap-
proach has been used by the Court in other cases. See, Camara v. Municipal
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If the courts are to adopt a balancing approach to determine
whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
they ought to start with a scale fully weighted in favor of the con-
stitutional right asserted; that is, the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. In order for the government to
tip -the scale in its favor, it should be required to come forward
with sufficient reasons why an intrusion upon this right is justified.
Our Constitution was adopted to give all citizens and aliens pro-
tection from the government. In balancing away these protections
the Judiciary ought to examine with care all of the factors which
weigh for and against the government. And the Judiciary ought
not to permit any greater infringement on these rights than the
facts indicate are necessary. As Justice Stewart points out in Al-
meida-Sanchez:
The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with
the Constitution's protections of the individual against cer-
tain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predict-
ability of these pressures that counsels resolute loyalty to
constitutional safeguards. 9
Justice Powell's balancing leads him to the conclusion that
the scale tips in favor of the government, even to the extent of
allowing a search when the search is done under a proper warrant
issued by a judicial officer. The factors he uses to reach this con-
clusion, however, need to be examined. The fact that there has
been "consistent judicial approval"'10 of such roving patrol searches
would seem to indicate that the courts which have acquiesced
therein have simply concluded that the balance must be struck in
favor of the government. A further examination of the balancing
process, as discussed hereafter, leads to a different conclusion.
Justice Powell also raises the question of whether there is a
"reasonable alternative for the solution of . . . [this] serious
problem."'1 There is indeed such an alternative.
The Justice's balancing would permit the Border Patrol to
search every car in a given area under a proper warrant. That
"would declare a field day for the police in searching automo-
biles,""2 a field day that is not called for here. The Border
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 (1967), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1968).
9. 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
10. Id., at 279.
11. Id., at 279.
12. Id., at 269. (Emphasis added.)
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Patrol does not search every car crossing the border, although it
has the right to do so. 13  Nor is the Patrol's right to search con-
fined to the border. The Court in Almeida-Sanchez expressly ap-
proves searches at internal points determined to be "functional
equivalents" of the border. 4 Like the border situation, not every
car that passes through a checkpoint is searched.
These practices indicate that it is not necessary to search
every vehicle in order to have an effective defense against the en-
try of illegal aliens. Thus, a reasonable alternative which is less
destructive of Fourth Amendment rights appears. It ought to be
utilized. The alternative is to give the Border Patrol the authority
by warrant to do nothing more than to stop cars at inland points,
which are not "functional equivalents" of the border, to make rou-
tine inquiries concerning the nationality of the occupants.
While such stops would still involve an interference with the
"right to free passage without interruption,"' 5 the time, place, and
manner for such interruption would be constantly reviewed by a
judicial officer. After stopping the vehicle and making inquiry
into the nationality of the occupants, if the officer becomes aware
of facts which give him probable cause to believe that there may
be illegal aliens or contraband in the car, a search ithen becomes
justified."0
The extent of the search would then be governed by the facts
learned by the officer. If he detects the odor of marijuana, as
the officer did in Bowman, he may search the car for it. But if
the facts discovered relate only to the possibility that the car may
be carrying illegal aliens, the search should be confined to those
parts of the car capable of carrying such persons.1 7  This pro-
cedure would be far more consistent with Justice Powell's concern
that there only be "a modest intrusion on those whose automobiles
are . . . [stopped.]"" Furthermore, if the search resulted in the
officer finding illegal aliens or contraband in -the car, the question
13. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a), 8 U.S.C., § 1357(a) (1970).
14. 413 U.S. 266, 272-273 (1973).
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 123, 154 (1925).
16. This procedure is in accord with that approved in the Bowman Case,
487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973), except that the Tenth Circuit did not require
a warrant.
17. For a discussion of the scope of the search, see 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REV.
657, supra note 1, at 673.
18. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
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of whether he had probable cause to search could be reviewed
by a court on a motion to suppress the evidence.
There are two other factors which, when brought into the bal-
ancing process, support limiting the Patrol's authority to one of
stop and inquiry. Judge Wallace, dissenting in Bowen, expresses
concern about the immensity of the illegal alien problem and he
points out that both Justices Powell and White indicate like con-
cern in Almeida-Sanchez. Judge Wallace writes:
Both Justice Powell and White refer to the Herculean chal-
lenges faced by those directed to prevent illegal aliens.19
While the Border Patrol may well have a problem on its
hands and is exhausting all of its resources, the rest of the govern-
ment clearly is not doing so. If Congress were really concerned
about "stemming the avalanche of persons illegally crossing our
borders,"2 one wonders why Congress has not made it a crime
to employ illegal aliens in this country. 2' This alone would prob-
ably do more to bring the problem under control than the present
methods of searching a limited number of automobiles at or near
the border.
Furthermore, although not expressly articulated in these
cases, there is discrimination here on the basis of nationality. The
likelihood of a person not of Mexican descent being stopped, let
alone being searched, is quite remote. And discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, or alienage is considered to be "in-
herently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. ' 22  The
19. 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
20. Id.
21. H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which makes it a federal offense
to knowingly employ an illegal alien, has passed the House of Representatives and
is now in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 119 CONG. REC. S. 8309 (daily Ed.
May 7, 1973). The question of why H.R. 982 is bottled up in the Senate has
been the subject of several recent articles in the San Diego Evening Tribune. See
San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 26, 1974, at A-14, col. 1, Oct. 3, 1974, at B-
2, col. 1, Oct. 10, 1974, at A-13, col. 1. California attempted to solve the problem
locally by enacting a statute making it a crime to employ an illegal alien in the
state. This statute was held unconstitutional in DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App.
3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See also, Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). As noted in the text accompanying note 26,
infra, the overwhelming majority of cars passing through checkpoints are not
stopped. See also, United States v. Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d
1109 (9th Cir. 1974) where the only reason for the stop and search was that the
occupant appeared to be of Mexican descent.
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government bears a heavy burden in justifying any discrimination
on that basis.
Before the scales are tipped in favor of the government, all
of the above factors should be considered. The factors to be
weighed on the side of the individual who may be subjected to
a search are: (1) that his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches is involved; (2) that the government de-
sires to infringe upon that right even though the government itself
has not been willing to utilize all available methods to solve the
illegal alien problem; (3) that even a stop and inquiry procedure
will discriminate against American citizens of Mexican descent;
and (4) that there is a reasonable alternative to a stop and search
program.
On the other hand, recognizing that there is a legitimate
governmental interest in the detection of illegal aliens which must
be balanced against a limited infringement upon Fourth Amend-
ment rights, a reasonable alternative would be to give the Border
Patrol authority to stop and make routine inquiries concerning the
nationality of the occupants of a car. This, of course, must occur
only under a properly drawn warrant, the need for which should
be periodically reviewed by a judicial officer.23 This type of war-
rant procedure would indeed be only "a modest intrusion on those
whose cars are . . . [stopped] ''2 4 even though it would not entirely
eliminate the discrimination which exists in the stopping of cars
occupied by American citizens of Mexican descent. However, a
judicially sanctioned warrant procedure, limited to stop and
inquiry, would place all citizens and legally admitted aliens on the
same footing. It would be improper to conduct a search of a car
legitimately stopped whether driven by a person of Mexican des-
cent or a non-Mexican unless the officer could show to the court
that he had probable cause to do so.
H. WARRANT PROCEDURE IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA
As a result of the decisions in Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen,
which effectively halted the checkpoint operations of the I.N.S.
along the California-Mexican border, the I.N.S. applied to the
23. Although Justice Powell's suggested warrant procedure relates only to
roving patrols, there is no reason why it should not also apply to checkpoints.
24. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
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Honorable Edward A. Infante, Magistrate, U. S. District Court for
the Southern District of California, requesting a warrant to keep
open its checkpoint at San Clemente, California. After reviewing
the affidavits of two Border Patrol officers, and examining the
facts set forth in United States v. Baca,25 relating to the need to
maintain such checkpoints, Magistrate Infante issued a Warrant of
Inspection. This warrant, which was issued June 22, 1974, gave
the Border Patrol the authority:
(1) to conduct an immigration traffic checkpoint on the
northbound lanes of Interstate Route 5, five miles south of
San Clemente, California, and;
(2) to stop northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of
making routine inquiries to determine the nationality and/or
immigration status of the occupants of said vehicles, and;
(3) to conduct routine inspection of said vehicles for the
presence of aliens, . . .26
Magistrate Infante also included in the warrant certain record
keeping requirements relating to the number of vehicles passing
the checkpoint, the number stopped, the number inspected, and
the number of aliens discovered, together with a recapitulation
of the number of deportable aliens apprehended. The warrant
with the information required was to be returned within ten days.
On the return date a Border Patrol officer reported as
follows:
A. The checkpoint was operated for a total of 124 hours
and ten minutes during which 145,960 vehicles passed
through the checkpoint;
B. 802 vehicles were stopped at the checkpoint for ques-
tioning;
C. 202 vehicles were inspected;
D. Aliens were found in 171 vehicles;
E. 725 deportable aliens were apprehended in vehicles
stopped at this checkpoint;
25. 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973). After the Almeida-Sanchez deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit consolidated several cases and remanded them to the Dis-
trict Court for consideration in light of that decision. After a lengthy factual
analysis, it was the conclusion of the District Court that searches at the San Cle-
mente checkpoint and other checkpoints were border searches for immigration
purposes. The Baca opinion provides an excellent factual analysis of the illegal
alien problem.
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F. No property was seized. 27
Since June 22, 1974, similar warrants have been issued to the
Border Patrol by several of the District Court Judges in the
Southern District of California. Magistrate Infante has also con-
tinued to issue such warrants. However, these warrants do not
give the Border Patrol authority "to conduct routine inspection of
said vehicles for the presence of aliens ... -. Under the new
warrants the Patrol's authority is limited to stopping vehicles for
routine inquiry concerning nationality. Any search of an automo-
bile must then be based upon independent facts learned by the
officer that would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
Operating under the June 22, 1974, warrant, the Patrol
stopped and searched a car driven by Amado Martinez-Fuerte
through the San Clemente checkpoint. 29  The car carried two per-
sons who admitted to being in the country illegally. The driver
was arrested, charged and convicted of inducing entry and trans-
portation of two illegal aliens into the United States. The case
is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and among the questions
submitted for review is the constitutionality of the warrant.8 0
According to Justice Powell, a constitutional warrant would
be one issued after due consideration of a number of relevant fac-
tors. In Almeida-Sanchez he wrote:
Although the standards for probable cause in the context of
-this case are relatively unstructured... there are a number of
relevant factors which merit consideration: they include (i)
the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are
known or reasonably believed to be transported within a par-
ticular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the
border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics
of the area, including the roads therein and the extent of
their use, and (iv) the probable degree of interference with
the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of
27. Id.
28. File No. Misc. 440, United States District Court, Southern District of
California. Some of these warrants are also for checkpoints other than the one
at San Clemente. Of the five Judges serving the Southern California District, two
have held that the warrants are unconstitutional. One Judge has upheld the war-
rants, while another has issued such a warrant and therefore supports their valid-
ity. The fifth Judge has not made his position public.
29. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed
July 9, 1974).
30. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 27, 1974).
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the proposed search, its duration, and the concentration of il-
legal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road
or area.3 '
If one views these as general considerations to which a judi-
cial officer should address himself before issuing a warrant, it ap-
pears that the testimony in United States v. Baca,32 is sufficient
to justify Justice Powell's conclusion that there "exist[s] a consti-
tutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause. ' 33 But even as-
suming that there exists probable cause to support some type of
a warrant, a balancing of all the relevant factors discussed herein
should lead to the conclusion that this probable cause should sup-
port no more than the right to stop and inquire. In addition to
the factors discussed above, there is another very good reason why
this conclusion should follow. These are general warrants. The
judicial officer who issues them cannot specify which car to search,
nor can he command the articles to be seized.3 4  Therefore only
after the patrol officer has secured sufficient information, follow-
ing the stop and inquiry, to constitute probable cause, should he
be allowed to search. If he does not elicit sufficient information,
then no probable cause exists to intrude upon the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the occupants.
III. CONCLUSION
There appear to be sufficient votes on the Supreme Court
to uphold the warrants now being issued in the Southern District
of California. While these warrants are now limited to stop and
inquiry, acceptance of Justice Powell's warrant procedure may give
the Border Patrol authority to search.
By restricting the warrants to stop and inquiry the judicial
officers of the Southern District of California are making a fair
accomodation between constitutional rights and legitimate govern-
mental interests. A balancing of these interests does not call for
any greater infringement upon the right of all citizens "to use the
public highways . . . [with] a right to free passage without inter-
ruption . ... s
31. 413 U.S. 266, 283-284 (1973).
32. 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
33. 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
34. See 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 657, supra note 1, at 662-669. Our ab-
horence to general warrants is sufficiently understood by all so that further illuci-
dation is unnecessary here.
35. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 123, 154 (1925).
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It is hoped that when the Supreme Court is actually faced
with the problem it will limit the warrant procedure to one of stop
and inquiry for the reasons suggested herein. When Border Pa-
trol searches are made, adherence to Fourth Amendment values
should require that the search be subsequently approved by a judi-
cial officer. It would then be -the responsibility of the judiciary
to see that there is no greater infringement upon constitutional
rights than is necessary to enforce legitimate governmental inter-
ests.
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